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RECENT CASES
there is much variance' and the better rule appears to be stated in
Moraitis v. Delany,' which holds that the circumstances of the cases
may vary the length of the detention. It is, however, agreed and con-
stantly emphasized that deportation is not a criminal process? and
the right to confine an alien is merely incidental to the right to ex-
clude and expel.' Abuse of this right is imprisonment contrary to
the Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution," although
the alien may be held during the deportation proceedings and for a
reasonable period thereafter." At least one case, Petition of Brooks,"
sustains the proposition that such conditional release as is found in
the instant case is unjustified and the alien must be deported or re-
leased. Should the court choose to follow United States ex rel. Doukas
v. Wiley," petitioner might, on the other hand, be subject to deporta-
tion as long as 24 years after the issuance of the original order of
deportation. It appears that laches does not deprive the order of its
effectiveness, ' although in Petition of Popper the court said a de-
portation order was Junctus officio where the government failed to
exercise its right of deportation. In that case it was held that such
an order was not a bar to naturalization.
The deposition of the Staniszewski case, however, appears not to
be a conclusive adjudication of the rights of petitioner since the gov-
ernment by its own admission cannot dispose of him as the deporta-
tion order directs. It would seem that the court has temporarily
sidestepped the issue. If, as in Petition of Popper," where the fact
situation has aspects similar to the instant case, the government is
ever to remain silent on the order, then the rule in Petition of
Brooks"s would serve the same purpose more efficiently and judi-
ciously.
CODE PLEADING-JOINDER OF PARTIES AND CAUSES OF AcTION-RIGHT
TO JOIN LIABILITY INSURER WITH INSURED AS PARTIES DEFENDANT. A Far-
go, North Dakota, ordinance' requires taxicab operators within that
Caranica v. Nagle, 28 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1928) (two months detention
reasonable); United States v. Wallis, supra note 6 (four months detention reasonable);
Saksoganski v. Weedin, supra note 6 (30 days reasonable.)
3 46 F. Supp. 425 (D. Md. 1942).
9 Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
1949 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
1" Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238 (D. Mass. 1925.)
U Petition of Brooks, supra note 10.
"- Bauer v. Watkins, 171 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1948).
" Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238 (D. Mass. 1925).
760 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1947).
Restivo v. Clark, 90 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1937); Seif v. Nagle, 14 F.2d 416
(9th Cir. 1926).
16 79 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
17 Ibid.
P 5 F.2d 238 (D. Mass. 1925), holding that alien must be deported or un-
conditionally released.
I Fargo Revised Ordinances, art. 22, 1 306 (1939), as amended by Ordin.
ance No. 700 (Dec. 29, 1943).
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city to carry liability insurance indemnifying the public against in-
juries. Plaintiff, a paying taxi-passenger injured in a collision, brought
suit for damages, joining inter alia as parties defendant the taxicab
owner and his liability insurer. The insurer demurred for (1) mis-
joinder of parties defendant, arguing that there exists in North Da-
kota a public policy against mentioning insurance in a jury trial;
and for (2) misjoinder of causes of action, contending that the cause
of action in tort for the negligent acts of the taxicab operator could
not be joined with the cause of action in contract upon the insurance
policy. Held, there was a proper joinder of both parties and causes
of action under the particular circumstances involved. James v.
Young, 43 N. W. 2d 692 (N. D. 1950).
This decision is far from a blanket authority to join as defendants
any insured and his liability insurer. Only two states, by express
terms of statute, permit such a liberal joinder procedure.! North
Dakota, on the other hand, specifically prohibits joinder of the in-
surer of a common motor carrier,' and impliedly prohibits joinder of
the insurer of an ordinary motor vehicle owner or operator.' In a
situation not covered by these express prohibitions, the right to join-
der depends upon an interpretation of general pleading statutes, or
in the absence of statute, upon the common law.' The instant decision
is based upon the general pleading statutes in the North Dakota Re-
vised Code.
The North Dakota statute on joinder of parties defendant declares
in sweeping terms that "Any person who has or claims an interest in
the controversy adverse to the plaintiff...may be made a defen-
dant."' This would seem to make any insurer, whose pecuniary in-
terests are certainly adverse to the plaintiff, a proper party defen-
dant; but even so, there is no right to sue the insurer either jointly
or separately unless there exists also a cause of action against him.' In
the ordinary voluntary insurance situation there is no cause of action
in contract, since there is no privity of contract between the injured
2 La. Acts 1930, No. 55; Vis. Stats. § 260.11 (1933).
s N.D. Rev. Code § 49-1833 (1943): "In an action for damages resulting
from the negligence of such carrier, the insurer... shall not be joined as a party
defendant..."
N.D. Rev. Code § 39-1611 (Supp. 1949): "Neither ... the security filed, nor
the insurance carried or furnished as provided in this chapter shall be referred
to in any v..... at the trial of any action at law to recover damages." The purpose
of these statutes prohibiting joinder is to protect the insurance companies "against
the well-known tendency of jurors to fail to consider merits if a defendant in an
automobile accident case is insured." Miller v. Metropolitan Casualty Co., 50 R. I.
166, 146 Atl. 412, 414 (1929).
There is no right to joinder at common-law, since an action ex contractu
cannot be joined with an action ex delicto. Conwell v. Hays, 103 W. Va. 69, 136
S.E. 604,605 (1927); Shipman, Common Law Pleading 202 (3d ed., Ballantine,
1923).
0 N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0206 (1943).
1 Charlton v. Van Etten, 55 F. 2d 418 (D. Minn. 1932) (by implication);
Stearns v. Graves, 61 Idaho 232, 99 P. 2d 955, 959 (1940).
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party and the insurer;' nor is there a cause of action in tort, since
the insurer had nothing to do with the negligent acts causing the
injuries. In short, in the voluntary insurance situation, the injured
party has no cause of action against the insurer, but only against the
insured who caused his injuries, and so there is no right to join the
insurer as a party defendant.'
But the instant case involved compulsory insurance under a city
ordinance designed expressly to "...indemnify those using such taxi-
cab line and the public in general against loss to person and pro-
perty.""1 Since statutory provisions are written into every poli-
cy,' the effect of this ordinance was to make the injured plaintiff a
third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract;" as such he had a
right of action in contract against the insurer,;' in addition to his
right of action in tort against the taxi operator. The instant case holds
that these two causes of action arose out of the same transaction, and
are therefore joinable under North Dakota's liberal code provision on
joinder of causes of action," designed to avoid multiplicity of suits.'
In so holding, the court is in accord with other jurisdictions having
similar code provisions."
s Bowers v. Gates, 201 Mich. 146, 166 N. W. 880. 881 (1918); Embler v. Hart-
ford Ins. Co., 158 N. Y. 431, 53 N. E. 212 (1899); 6 Blashfield, Cyc. of Automo-
bile Law and Practice § 4071 (Perm. ed. 1945). It seems fairly obvious that the
insured takes out insurance, not to benefit a third person he may injure, but to pro-
tect his own pocketbook from suits by that third person.
' Charlton v. Van Etten, 55 F. 2d 419 (D. Minn. 1932); Universal Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Denton, 185 Ark, 505 S. W. 2d 592, 595 (1932); Artille v. Davidson,
126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936), aff'd sub nom. State ex rel. Davidson v. Parks,
129 Fla. 64, 175 So. 792 (1937); Zeigler v. Ryan, 63 S. D. 607, 262 N. W. 200
(1935) (statutes and situation parallel to instant case, except that insurance carried
was voluntary).
10 Fargo Revised Ordinances, art. 22, § 306 (1939), as amended by Ordinance
No. 700 (Dec. 29, 1943).
11 Malmgren v. Southwestern Auto Ins. Co., 201 Cal. 29, 255 Pac. 512 (1927);
Ducommun v. Strong, 193 Wis. 179, 212 N. W. 289 (1927).
0 Butler v. Eureka Security Ins. Co., 21 Tenn. App. 97, 105 S. W. 2d 523
(1937) (compulsory school bus insurancd); Stusser v. Mutual Union Ins. Co., 127
Wash. 449, 221 Pac. 331 (1923) (compulsory bus driver's bond).
1' Great American Indemnity Co. v. Vickers, 183 Ga. 233, 188 S. E. 24 (1936).
"4 N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0703 (1943): "The plaintiff may unite in the same
complaint several causes of action... when they all arise out of... the same trans-
action or transactions connected with the same subject of action...'
15 Stark County v. Mischel, 33 N. D. 432, 440, 156 N. W. 931, 933 (1916).
2' Temple v. Dugger, 164 Okla. 84, 21 P. 2d 482 (1933); Scott v. Wells, 214
S. C. 511. 53 S. E. 2d 400 (1949); Piper v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co.,
157 S. C. 106, 154 S. E. 106, 109 (1930); DeVoto v. United Auto Transp. Co., 128
Wash. 604, 223 Pac. 1050 (1924); cf. American Auto Ins. Co. v. Struwe, 218 S.W.
534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). But cf. Stearns v. Graves, 61 Idaho 232, 99 P. 2d 955
(1940); Ellis v. Bruce, 215 Iowa 308, 245 I. W. 320, (1932).
The court in the instant case also referred to N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §-22-0206,
which states that "One who indemnifies another person against an act to be done
by the latter is liable jointly with the person indemnified and separately to every
person injured by such act." It is submitted that this is a liability statute found
in the code chapter on "Indemnity", and has nothing to do with the procedural
question of joinder of parties and causes. Northam v. Casualty Co. of America, 177
F. 981 (D. C. Mont. 1909), semble.
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The insurer probably could have avoided the result of the instant
decision by inserting in its policy a "no action" clauseF The courts
generally hold that such a clause forbids joinder of the insurer in a
suit against the insured;' and only a specific statute enabling joinder
of the insurer will override such a clause within a policy."
The case appears to be one of first impression in North Dakota,
although three other cases have been found which consider the related
question of the propriety of informing jurors that the defendant has in-
surance, when no insurer is a party to the record. A careful study
of these cases' indicates that the North Dakota Supreme Court recog-
nizes the prejudicial effect of such information where it is injected
for no purpose other than to encourage a larger verdict against the
defendant; but these cases in no way deny the right to join an insur-
ance company as defendant where a direct cause of action exists
against that company under a reasonable construction of our plead-
- ing statutes.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALIEN LAND LAws-
EFFECT OF UNrIED NATIONS cHAs -xs. The California Alien Land Law'
prohibits, except as prescribed by treaty, the ownership of agricultural
land' by aliens ineligible to citizenship, and provides for the escheat
17 A "no action'- clause provides that no action can be brought against the in-
surer until the liability of the insured is first determined by judgment against him.
It is designed to keep the-fact of insurance out of a jury trial. See Morgan v. Hunt,
196 Wis. 298, 220 N. W. 224 (1928); Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, §
4861 (1942)..
" Stearns v. Graves, 61 Idaho 282, 99 P. 2d 955, 958 (1940). See, holding that
a "no action" clause forbids joinder of an insurer even where the policy is writ-
ten under a compulsory insurance statute: Pageway Coaches v. Bransford, 71 S. W.
2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), aff'd 129 Tex. 327, 104 S. W. 2d 471 (1937); Polzin
v. Wachtl, 209 Wis. 289, 245 N. W. 182 (1932); cf. Milliron v. Dittman, 180 Cal
443, 181 Pac. 779 (1919). Contra: Thompson v. Bass, 167 S. C. 845, 166 S. E. 346
(1932).
19 Compare Bergstein v. Popkin, 202 Wis. 625, 233 N. W. 572 (1930), with
Lang v. Baumann, 213 Wis. 258, 251 N. W. 461 (1933).
'2 Beardsley v. Ewing, 40 N. D. 373, 168 N. W. 791 (1918) (holding it is
within discretion of trial court to declare mistrial if plaintiff so questions witness
that jurors learn that defendant is insured); Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 N. D. 708,
193 N. W. 312 (1923) (holding trial court must declare mistrial upon defendant's
motion, if plaintiff so questions witness that jurors learn that defendant is insured);
Jacobs v. Nelson, 67 N. D. 27, 268 N. W. 873 (1936) (holding that where defen-
dant has sought to impeach credibility of plaintiff's witness, plaintiff can by his
witness bri'": out the fact of insurance when necessary to explain the impeaching
matter; defendant in effect invited plaintiff to put in prejudicial matter of Insur-
ance).
1 1 Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 261 (Deering 1944, Supp. 1945). In North Dakota
aliens are authorized by N. D. Rev. Code §§ 47-0111 and 56-0116 (1943) to ac-
quire and dispose of land as if they were citizens.
I Although the prohibition refers to all "real property" it actually applies
only to agricultural land, because of a commercial treaty between the United
States and Japan, 37 Stat. 1504 (1911), authorizing citizens of Japan "to lease
land for residential and commercial purposes. . ." Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U. S. 123
(1928).
